5 That not because, if this were the case, then it would follow that the divine wishing would as much and as perfectly influence and act for the production of one thing as for another, indeed as much for the non-being of thing as for its production in being. The consequent seems to be false. And the consequence is clear because everything that the divine willing immediately produces for the production of this thing infinitely concurs and influences. This is clear because its causality is not able to be supplied by any second cause.

6 In the second place, it follows that the divine wishing would be the per se cause of sin and deformity. The consequent is false. And the consequence is clear because, if God is the causal principle of the non-being of the grace of Socrates, then to this it follows formally Socrates is in a state of cult. The inference follows.

7 In the third place, that, which from itself, when everything else is removed formally has non-being, this it does not have from another, but it is the non-being of this thing, therefore. The major is known. The minor is apparent because some creature left to itself does not having anything except non-being, therefore it also has in itself a principle leading this to non-being unless it is conserved by God in being.

8 In opposition, it is argued that non being from itself does not have non being, therefore it is causally had from another. The consequences is valid. But the proof of the antecedent is because, if it were the case, then it would follows that non being would be necessary non being, and thus through no power would be able to be put into being, which is false.

9 First conclusion: though the divine wishing is to act externally and infinitely according to modes that are repugnant to creatures, nevertheless it always externally in a finite way according to conditions common to it and to a second cause. The first part is clear because the divine willing acts independently with the principle of infinite perfection as the the first cause without which another second cause is not able to act, and to act in this way is repugnant to a second cause no matter how much its perfection and activity is increased, therefore this first part is true. But the second part is proved because to act with some finite effect in finite time, with finite velocity and with a sometimes greater and sometimes lesser effect is evidence that something acts finitely. But these conditions are suitable to God and creatures when acting at the same time, therefore.

10 First corollary: just it is not repugnant that a creature according to various senses finitely and infinitely loves God, so it is not repugnant that God according to various respects influences externally L115v both finitely and infinitely. The first part is proved because the creature finitely loves God when refering finitely to his power and to the act of loving, and nevertheless at the same time loves God infinitely according to appreciability and preference because the creature prefers God over an infinity of other created goods, if such an infinity of goods existed. The second part is clear through the conclusion and is proof.

11 Second corollary: though God does not act externally infinitely according to an adequate termination and according to the ultimate exhaustion of his virtual influence, nevertheless he acts externally infinitely according to the immensity of his cause, as marks of his nobility and excellence. The first part is clear because, if God were to act in the first mode, it would follows that he would not be able to do more or act in a more perfect way intensively or extensively. The consequent is false because for any given effect, God is able to produce a more perfect effect. The second part is proved because God is not only in himself an absolute and formally infinite being, but also acts in the mode of infinite excellence and eminence because [he acts] independently as the first efficient cause ultimate end and as having full omnipotence, therefore.

12 Third corollary: though for any given or giveable effect God is able to produce something more perfect, nevertheless God as much as he is from his own part is capable of the production of now effect more perfect than what he concurs to concur. The first part is clear though what is said elsewhere. The second part is proved from the conclusion because God as much as he is from his own part always infinitely concurs and does not generate his Son more perfectly than he produces a fly when referring to the word 'more perfectly' as the perfection of the producing principle. But if it were noted the perfection of the preceding term, then it should be said that he produces the Son infinitely more perfect than man or an angel just as the Son is unproportionally more perfect than an angel or a man.

13 Second conclusion: though no one absolutely becomes causally evil with God will this or God as the agent, nevertheless in the evil actions of the guilty party God wills to co-act secundum quid and in a conditional way. The first part is clear from Augustine, 83 quesitons, question 3 ^[e] where he argues thus, " when no man acts wisely man becomes worse ", but God is more excellent than every wise man, therefore no one becomes worse when God acts, for the will of God is much better than the will of any wise man. But it is the case that it is possible for a wise man to effectively cause evil by which someone evil is effected. The second part is proved because however much more God wishes that this positive act does not occur, nevertheless if the created will wills that this occurs and produces this and does not obey God, then God will not remove his general influence, but leaves the will to its own liberty. Whence just someone throwing merchandise into the sea does not will absolutely to throw away merchandise but only conditionally because he would rather be deprived of reaches than his life, so in the proposed. Again, just as a father draws the ship with his son so that it does not remain in the river and nevertheless earlier prohibited the son from moving, when the son draws, the father coacts, nevertheless he does not properly will that his son draws the ship, indeed he is displeased even though he coacts with the son, so in the proposed God wills evil acts with a mixture of involuntariness, and concerning this mixture of the voluntary with the involuntary it is discussed in III Ethics ^[f] .

14 The first corollary: though with respect to good acts morally the divine willing precedes the created will causally, nevertheless in acts of the L125r will which are defectively evil the divine will does not concur effectively prior to the created willing. This is clear through Blessed Augustine, XIII De civitate Dei, in chapter 15 , who says, " for the evil surely the will of man is prior, and the will of God is posterior, but it is the reverse in good things " ^[g] .

15 Second corollary: therefore the divine will acts in evil things because the human will acts and not the reverse. This is clear because, if this were the reverse it would follow that before the act God would have pre-ordained it and approved it through the law. And thus with respect to this it would have to be the case that he willed this without the admixture of any involuntariness, which is against the conclusion. This is clear in the preceding example about the one drawing the ship which is against the father's command, with whom the father draws the ship therefore because the son who is free is entirely wishing to draw the ship.

16 Third corollary: though the divine willing is not the cause of sin or is not causing evil things, nevertheless the divine willing of an evil act or of sin is an effective cause. The first is clear because otherwise it follows that God would be the cause of evil as evil and that evil would be evil since it is from God, which is false. The consequence is clear because the word 'evil' or 'sin' discussed in the aforesaid part names its own form. The second part is proved because though this it only denoted that God is the cause of this thing which is sin, and this is true because God is the cause or co-cause of any act.

17 From what has been said it would be able to be inferred that, just as defect or evilness in an act of the will does not always come forth by reason of human cognition, so the defect or evilness in the act of the will never come forth from the divine volition or creation. For a similar reason it is clear that a defect in an offspring sometimes happens due to the mother and sometimes due to the father, sometimes due to another influence ... and thus the defect is sometimes attributed to one party and not to another. Thus, though God is the cause of defective act, nevertheless he is not the cause of the defective act morally and nor should it be imputed to him inasmuch as it is defective.

18 Third conclusion: though there is not some properly productive cause of non-being, that which is not is abl to be assigned a positive cause. The first part is clear because after having removed every productive and conservative cause non-being would not be or would not have being, as it now has, therefore. The second part is proved through Anselm, De casu diaboli, in chapter 3, , where he says, " therefore God did not give perseverance because the angel did not accept it " ^[h] . Again, it would follow that for any negative proposition no cause would bought sought and nor would there be an assigning of the what of this thing, which opposes Aristotle, I Posteriorum ^[i] .

19 First corollary: therefore non being is not or does not have being that exists because God does not will to produce it in being. This is proved because therefore a is allowed to be because God ceases to conserve a in being, therefore. The conclusion is true, the consequence is good, and the antecedent is proved because therefore a either is or begins to be because God wishes a to be. The aforesaid consequence is clear because to not conserve a implies the non being of the very same a. This is confirmed because that which destroys and annihilates a is fittingly identified as the cause of it. But the divine willing is principally what destroys it etc., therefore.

20 The second corollary: though God is not properly the defective cause of some natural defect, nevertheless he is able to be called the negative cause of actiong which is required for the perfection of some effect. The first part is clear because to be cause in the first way would be an indication of insufficiency or impotency or a lack of some owed circumstance or a lack of something that is fitting for God to have, which ought not to be said. Second part is proved because therefore the natural perfection on the part of the effect is missing and is missing from the produced thing because God did not produce it or did not provide the influence needed for its being, and in this way God is able to be called the negative cause, improperly and secundum quid, of a natural defect.

21 Third corollary: not everything that depends causally on the divine willing is a positive thing or being formally. This is clear because death, which is justly inflicted on account sin, is truly numbered amount the works of God, therefore the corollary is true. The consequence is clear since death is not something positive but privative. The antecedent is clear from the Master, in distinction 38 of book 1 ^[j] , from which it is able to be inferred that the divine willing concurs effectively even from the non-being of something. And through this it is clear what should be said to the question, namely that the productive divine willing of something is able to be identified as the cause of non-being or of the privation of things, though it is not properly able to be called the productive cause of non-being or the privation of those things, as is clear from the third conclusion.

22 Against the first part of the first conclusion ^[k] , it is argued in the first place thus, the free created power through the liberty of the will is able to act more perfectly in cooperation with one cause than with another and through one exchange than through another, therefore God also is able to create according to conflicting modes. The consequence holds because God is freer than a human being or an angel. And the antecedent is clear because Socrates is able to strive and try to will more now than he previously tried, though the operation is not more perfect due to some impediment or some lessening of assistance.

23 In the second place, God more perfectly co-acts with that cause with which it co-acts through a special assistance beyond his general influence than with that cause with which it co-acts through his general influence only, therefore he does not always act in an infinite and perfect way. The antecedent is proved because this cause is more greatly assisted by God, therefore.

24 In the third place, God more perfectly acts when creating by himself than when acting for the drawing out of forms from the potency of matter by concurring with a second cause, therefore. The antecedent is proved this mode of acting, namely through creation, is not able to belong to anyone else, and nevertheless it is the case that the effect produced through this creation is not essentially more perfect than the effect produced from a second cause with God concurring. This case is possible because the same it possible that something the same in number and species is produced through creation by God alone and by a second cause while God is concurring, therefore the majority of production is not able posited in the effect but in God.

25 In the fourth place, God is more or less able to impeded, therefore is he is also able to co-act in a lesser degree. The antecedent is clear because when impeding he is able to make himself equivalent to this or that amount of resistance, but this majority or minority is not possible at first in the effect or able to posited precisely because the effect in this case is more perfect or less perfect because God more or less co-acts or impedes, therefore.

26 In the fifth place against the second part, because if God acts finitely this is either from a finitude which is God or in God formally or from a finitude which is a creature. Not the first because whatever is in God is infinite. Not the second because God causes formally through something existing in the creature formally, since he acts formally through his own willing.

27 In the sixth place, against another part God infinitely accepts the creature or will of one who is acting well and God loves one more than another, therefore he does not love something infinitely according to the infinitude which is God because then God would not be able to to accept it more or less, which is false.

28 Against the first part of the second conclusion ^[l] , God makes man with a special instinct to speak with a perverse thought, intention, and volition, therefore with God as the actor human beings are made evil. The consequence is clear. And the antecedent is clear through John 13 , where Caiaphas who decides that Christ should be killed lest the Jews lose their position says, " it is better for us that one man should die " ^[m] , etc. But he says this with the perverse thought that Christ should die so that they would not lose their temporal goods, and in so doing leads others to do this, just as Origen and Theophilius say. But there it is said that he prophesied and according to the gloss ^[n] the spirit of God spoke and he had this locution and its beginning, namely the thought and volition, from the Holy Spirit

29 In the second place, God with a special action impedes consent to the truth and includes one to concede to error, therefore human beings error because God antecedently inclines the will. The antecedent is clear through Augustine, libro De gratia et libero arbitrio, near the end ^[o] , where he posits that sometimes he inclines the heart of human beings to consent to evil or falsehood, and to support this he adds the verse from II Kings 17 , " the Lord decided to destroy the good counsel of Ahithopel in order to bring evil upon Absalom " ^[p] and he destroyed, as Augustine says, " by acting such that Absalom would reject this counsel and would choose another that was not beneficial for him " ^[q] .

30 In the third place against the second part ^[r] , if God wishes something under a condition, then either this condition is past or present, and not this because everything past or present is certain and absolutely determined. Or this condition would be some possible future, and this is not because then God will know determinately that some future thing will happen, therefore it would be futile for him to put his willing under a condition

31 In the fourth place, it is asked, either God wills that this condition will be or not. If the first, then he wishes either that the condition will be absolutely or not absolutely. If the second is granted, then it is asked again about this and so the process will go into infinity. If the first is granted, it follows by the same reason that was willing this principally, simply, and absolutely not conditionally.

32 In the fifth place, it follows that the position of the condition would be antecedently determining the divine willing to will and absolutely determining when the condition would be posited. the consequent is false, therefore.

33 In the sixth place, it follows that God intrinsically will be willing differently now than before. The consequent is false. The consequence is proved because now he wishes conditionally and when the condition will put into being he will wish it determinately.

34 In the seventh place, it follows that God would intrinsically will one future now more perfectly than another. The consequent is false. The consequence is proved because what he wishes absolutely and determinately he wishes now more perfection, more actually, and more determinately than that which he wishes in a conditional mode, just as that which I know that I have determinately I know now more certainly than that which I know that I have in a conditional mode.

35 Against the first and second corollaries , therefore the created will fails to act because God does not co-act nor wish to co-act, therefore also in evil and prohibited acts. Therefore the will commits an act because God co-acts, and consequently the will of God is prior in these acts. The consequences is clear because one is not more inconvenient than the other because one often sins only by omitting rather than committing. The antecedent is proved because sometimes a sinner therefore does not act will and does not rise up again without special help and because God does not help him. Whence Augustine, in de bono perseverentiae toward the middle says, " therefore he did not rise up because God did not lift him ".

36 In the second place, therefore the will L117v does good because God coacts, therefore it fails to act because God does not coact. The consequences holds because the negation is the cause of the negation where affirmation is the cause of affirmation.

37 In the third place, therefore this one is in sin because God withdrew grace from him, therefore because God did not act for the good, etc. The consequence is clear because the withdrawal of grace is the withdrawal of conservation and the maintenance of grace. and is the withdrawal of some effective causality. The antecedent is proved because therefore this one is a sinner because he deprived of rectitude and justice because God deprived him of these things.

38 Against the third corollary , God is the actor of this being because the being is sin, therefore he is the actor of sin.

39 In the second place, God is the actor of that which is a sin, therefore he is the author of sin. The consequence is clear because sin and that which is sin are convertible, and the former sin and the latter which is sin are similarly convertible, therefore. The antecedent is known.

40 In the third place, the one doing the sin is God, therefore God is the one doing the sin. The consequences is clear through simple conversion.

41 Against the third conclusion ^[w] , it is argued through Anselm, in the De casu diaboli, in chapter 1 , saying, " just as everything other than God has nothing from itself, so they are not from God unless they have something " ^[x] . Et infra " those things which are and which pass away to non being God himself does make these things not being " ^[y] because " just as from the highest good there is nothing except good, so from the highest essence there is nothing except essence. " ^[z] " Nothing therefore and non being is not from that from which there is nothing except good and essence. " ^[aa] . Again, through Augustine, in his book De moribus ecclesiae ^[ab] , " how, he says, is it possible that this, which is the cause of all things which are, with the result that they are is the cause of the contrary, so that they are not. For whatever is inasmuch as it is is from God but inasmuch as it lacks being it is not from God. " ^[ac] . He offers the same opinion in 83 question, in question 1 ^[ad] .

42 In the second place, with the argument anchored in the sayings of Augustine it is argued that no evil thing is from God but rather is evil by falling from being into non-being, therefore. The major comes from the same place, namely 83 questions, in question 2 ^[ae] , and similarly the minor.

43 In the third place, to lack being is evil, therefore God is not hte cause of this. The consequences is clear through what has been said. The antecedent is proved because what is against something's nature is an evil for everything because it destroyes the good of being.

44 To the first, it is said that, if 'more perfectly' is understood from the part of the effect, then it is conceded he is able to produced something more perfect. But if more perfectly is understood formally from the perspective of God, that is formally and really more perfect from the principle, then it is denied. Whence the Master, in book 1, distinction 44, chapter 3 , says, " those things which God makes he is not able to make in another mode or better, if the mode being referred to is the wisdom of the artist " ^[ag] . " But if it is referred to the thing made, then it is said that he is able to make it differently and in a better mode " ^[ah] . So in the proposed it should be said through this to the form. The consequences is denied when taking 'more perfectly' in the second mode. And the similarity is not valid because God does not act through his will at one time more perfectly and at another time less perfect as if acting through one or another immediate principle, just as is the case with an angel

45 To the second , the antecedent is denied when taking 'perfectly' on the part of God really and formally.

46 In the second place, it is said that when special influence it is said as something being added to general influence it should be understood from the perspective of God some grade of causality or beginning is added formally and really to another grade as if to something less perfect. But for God to act with a special influence is for God to act with a second cause to produce an effect or an effect to a certain degree which according to the regularly instituted order and common course of second causes for the action of these causes such an effect or an effect to this degree does not follow.

47 In the third place, it is said that when God acts with a special influence it is able to be said that he acts more perfectly, not formally or really on his part, but virtually and as if interpretatively because then he acts through some previously given mediating supernatural gift because the power of God, though it is simple and indivisible, nevertheless by reason of its own liberty is able to produce outside of itself unequal things, and likewise if his power were divisible and he were to act as if by an action formally inhering in himself, then he would at one time act more perfectly and at another time less perfect.

48 To the third, the antecedent is denied when taking the word 'more perfect' personally and significatively. And when it is said that " to create is not able to be communicated to the creature ", it is said here that no mode by which God acts is communicable to a creature because the creature is not able to act independently nor formally from an infinite beginning. But if is said that producing by creating is not able to be affirmed of a creature but instead drawing out the form from the potency of matter is able to suit the creature, then in this case conceded the antecedent, but deny the consequence.

49 To the fourth ^[al] , when it is said that, " God is able to [impede] in a greater or lesser degree ", this is not so unless in some virtual and non formal equivalence be because, if the major or minority is somewhere, then it is really in the effect which is greater or less in resistance or in created sin which is greater or less. And when it is said that, " therefore the effect is greater ", etc., it is said that if it is understood that such minority or majority is in God formally, then this is denied. But if it is understood that God wished for this effect to be and in this degree, then it is conceded that the divine willing is the cause of this.

50 To the fifth , it is said that in God there is not finite activity unless this is said equivalently and through a kind of likeness and interpretatively because he acts formally through an infinite principle even when he acts as if here were acting through a finite power, as has been said.

51 Ad sextam , it is said that God loves and approves finitely and infinitely according to diverse understandings of this express. For he loves infinitely because loves formally with an infinite love and even objectively and duratively to the infinite good Again, he loves finitely because he accepts this finite good as the formal intensively finite reward.

52 To the first against the second ^[aq] , the antecedent is denied. And to the proof it is said that God does not move Caiaphas to speak this bad decision, but because Caiapha wishes to speak this bad decision God accepted his words for it with the result it would be true in a prophetic sense which nevertheless when spoken it did not expressly have this sense in his mind.

53 To the second , the antecedent is denied. And to the proof about Achitophel it is said that it ought not to be understood that God inclines effectively to this, such that he urges or suggests per se, properly, and positively, but rather sometimes on account of the failures of human beings he permits their wills to be inclined to this and to be excited for these things and he permits occasions of sin and causes of sin and impediments of the good to be fulfilled either by man or by the devil, not by offering special help, but by abandoning by not reprimanding occasions of evil and impediments of the good, also sometimes by permitting a greater power or license to the enemy. See Augustine, De correptione et gratia ^[as] . Again, he inclines to evil sometimes through accident or indirectly, namely sometimes by conferring benefits to a person which are misused and when the person accepts the occasion for sin from the benefit by which he ought to have accepted the occasion for L118v acting well. Again, sometimes he administrates or permits something to be administrated to a bad person that is occasionally able to incline him to sin, nevertheless he does this while preserving the liberty of that person. An example is given by Chrysostus, in Super Matthaeum , " about a lord putting a sack of money before his servant in order to prove his fidelity, in this way God when he gives to a person the occasion for sinning he also gives this occasion to bad people, not so that he knows sinning, but so that he reveals the sinner " ^[at] . These are the things said by Chrysostus.

54 To the third , it is said that God will something occasionally is able to be understood in three ways. In the first mode, it is understood to be on account of ignorance or uncertainty of the condition, just as when we say, tomorrow I will do c if b will happen, and God does not will anything conditionally in this way. In the second mode, it is understood to be on account of some non-willing or disapproval and displeasure of the condition, just as when someone wishes to throw money in to the sea if they are in danger, and in this sense God is said to will positive acts which are prohibited. But this condition is from the fact that the will does not wish to preserve justice or obedience but rather wishes to go against the laws of God. Likewise it is in this way that he will to damn someone from the fact that this person posses a final impenitence. And that he does not will this absolutely is clear from Ezekiel 18 " I do not wish the death of the sinner, but that " ^[av] , etc. In the third mode, it is understood to be on account of the negation of the required condition, just as when I wish that you walk if it were healthy, and because I know the condition I do not state it, therefore I do not wish this absolutely, and thus in this sense God wishes the good things which he commands and advises, even though they do not occur. Likewise in this way he wishes for all people to be saved, if the human will were to wish for this and they were not rebelling against the divine will. Therefore to the form of the argument, it is able to be said that such a condition is able to be present or past. And when it is argued that, God knows something present, etc., it is said that, though it is certain to God absolutely and determinately that this is, namely that the prohibited act is, nevertheless he does not will the prohibited act absolutely. And likewise because according to those holding the opposite God knows absolutely that something evil is and will be, nevertheless he does not wish this absolutely and directly, but rather just as a doctor wishes for there to be a harmful drug in medicine or to make an incision in the one who is sick. To the disproof of the third member, it is said that reason alone proves that God does not naturally wish the condition in the first mode.

55 To the fourth , it is said that sometimes he does not will that a condition will be because he does not will that this person sins, nevertheless if he sins, then he does will to co-act with this act with his general influence. Likewise sometimes God wills a condition of this type, not absolutely but secundum quid because he does so with a mixture of the involuntary or displeasure. In this way God wills that his will causes a prohibited act, not absolutely and simply, but with a mixture of the volition for the previously prohibited act and the volition for the one who is displeasing and being detestable Therefore, when it is said, if God does not will this condition, therefore he wills some condition in vain, the consequences id denied because, though this is condition is put by another, nevertheless it is irrational and evil. And when it is said, further if he wishes this, etc., it follows that he is willing a condition under another condition, the consequence is denied. Nevertheless it does not follows that he is wishing this absolutely, but only secundum quid with a mixture of involuntariness, as has been said.

56 To the fifth , the consequence is denied because it proceeds L119r from will conditionally in the first mode, not in the second.

57 To the sixth , the consequence is denied for the same reason. And to the proof, because now and previously and always he will wish under this condition in the stated mode. Nor is this proof valid because it could be similarly proved that there is difference in God from the fact that first he wishes that a will be, and after that he wishes that is, and after that he wishes that it was.

58 To the seventh , the consequence is denied. To the proof, that he wishes in one mode in a more determinate way, this is denied because each willing is equally determinate and action on the part of God, though according to one thing it is said to be willing simply and absolutely, according to another it is said secundum quid and conditionally because on account of the liberty and illumination of that act various determinations are truly formed, just as from our will ad variety of acts are formed.

59 To the first against the corollaries ^[ba] , the antecedent is denied when taking the word 'to ommit' not only for negation and simple privation, but for a deformed privation with a new deformite, for which reason it is called sinning. And when it is further argued , the assumed is denied, indeed because the wickedness impedes it and because he does not previously do his best with the result that he is helped by a special help and yet with that help makes himself unworthy before the divine. And to this argument from Augustine it is able to be said that the word 'because' indicates a co-cause or a quasi-reasons and a propter quid conditional. For thus he was not resurrected because from his own liberty and with his wickedness impeding the sinner did not do his best, therefore God does not raise this person. And thus this reason why God does not raise this one is reducible to the argument taken from the part of the sinner, namely on account of unworthiness and defect of the sinner.

60 To the second , the consequence is denied, but how the rule ought to be understood was made clear above.

61 To the thrid , the antecedent is denied when taking the word 'grace' for a infusible habit. And to the proof, it is conceded that therefore this one is a sinner because he lacks the required rectitude. And when it is inferred, therefore this is because he lacked charity, the consequence is denied, for to lack charity is not formally to lack rectitude nor the converse, though they exists concomitantly and convertibly in the present life.

62 In the second place, it would be able to be said that, if to lack charity is to lack rectitude as if some habitual rectitude, then the consequence in such causal propositions does not follow.

63 To the first against the third corollary , the fallacy of the figure of speech is committed. Again a syllogistic form does not exist there because the entire middle is not taken in either premise, therefore the conclusion is false. But it would have to be concluded, therefore God is the actor of sin, this is conceded.

64 To the second , the consequence is denied, for just as art does not make that which is the image, but makes the image, so in the proposed. And it is conceded further that these are converted, but through this nothing is gained against the position, just as though b is and that b is white are converted and the same, nevertheless it does not follow, this is made white, therefore b is made.

65 To the third , the consequence is denied, namely this thing causing the image is nature, therefore nature is causing the image, or, the things knowing the Trinity were philosophers, therefore philosophers were the ones knowing the trinity. The reason is because on account of the nature of the terms the one converting knows something different than the one converted. Nevertheless if it were argued thus, God is the actor of this thing, but the actor of this thing is the actor of sin, therefore, this form is valid, but the minor is false.

66 To the first against the third conclusion , it is said 'that something is the cause of non-being' is understood in two ways. In the first mode, it is understood as that which impede this thing from existing and expels this thing from being and which if removed and if not impeding this thing would be in existence either from itself or from another cause. And in this sense it is not possible for God L119v to be a cause of non-being for any creature, and this is the sense understood by Anselm and Augustine. In the second mode, it is understood as that which when giving being the thing is and that which when not maintaining some other posited thing the thing is not. In this way God God is the cause of the non-being of things.

67 In the second place, it is able to be said that they do not speak about non-being absolutely and universally, but about non-being inclusive of deformity. Whence the author of all things, 83 questions, in question 21, concludes " is not, he says, the author of evil " ^[bj] , otherwise God would have been the reason why darkness was occurred during his passion. Again, " he is precious in the sight of the Lord ", etc., but nothing precious is good, therefore God wills something good. Again, the second cause causes the non-being of something, and this is not the case unless in virtue of the first cause co-acting with itself, therefore.

68 To the second , it is said, just as it was to the first, that God is the cause of imperfection or defect is understood in the first mode because God impedes the capacity for perfection and natural goodness and having removed this impediment with God neither impeding nor helping the thing would have this natural perfection, and in this way God is not the cause of the natural defect nor of monsters as such. In the second mode, he is understood as one who is giving this perfection and when he is not giving the thing would not have it regardless of whatever else is taken away, and in this way God is able to be called the cause of imperfection and natural defects and monsters.

69 To the third , it is also said that 'to be a defective cause' is able to be understood in the first mode as is known regrading the insufficiency or impotency in a cause and the circumstances of imperfection or a lack of the required circumstances or a lack of something appropriate in the cause, and in this way God is not a defective cause nor the cause of some defect. In the second mode and improperly it is able to be understood as is noted precisely the cause of the negation of something required for the being of this effect or perfection such that because this causality is not given, therefore this perfection on the part of the effect is not present and is lacking, and thus in this way God is the cause of defect understood improperly and secundum quid. In this way it is also able to be said that God is the cause of the blindness of someone, namely because of a not giving or not wishing to give or illuminate in the mode said above.

70 Through this it is clear what should be said to the third principal argument and to the first. And regarding the second it is clear through the above what should be said.